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Abstract
We analyze the design of a mechanism to extract ordinal information dis-
seminated in a social network. We show that friend-based ranking—the report
by individuals on the characteristics of their neighbors—is a necessary con-
dition for ex post incentive-compatible and efficient mechanism design. We
characterize the windmill network as the sparsest social network for which the
planner can construct a complete ranking. When complete rankings cannot be
achieved, ex post incentive-compatible and efficient mechanisms arise when so-
cial networks are bipartite or composed of triangles. We illustrate these findings
using real social networks in India and Indonesia.
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1 Introduction
In many social networks, individuals gradually acquire information about their neigh-
bors through repeated interactions. Pupils in a class learn about the ability of other
pupils with whom they write joint projects, workers in a firm learn about the produc-
tivity of the coworkers in their teams, and members of a community in a developing
country learn about the needs of their close friends. This information, which is dis-
seminated in the social network, may be of great use to an external planner who
wants to extract information about members of the community. A teacher wants to
learn about the ability of her pupils; an employer, the productivity of her workers; a
funding agency, the needs of villagers in a developing country.
In the classical literature on mechanism design, the principal designs a mechanism
which asks individuals to report on their own types. However, in some situations,
it is impossible to have individuals truthfully report on their own types without
relying on undesirable punishments. An alternative is to generate a mechanism which
ask individuals to report not on their own type but on the type of their neighbors
in the social network. Pupils are asked to assess the performance of other pupils,
workers are asked to measure the productivity of their coworkers, or villagers are
asked to rank other individuals in the community. The objective of our paper is to
analyze these mechanisms, that ask individuals to report about their neighbors in
the social network—mechanisms that we term “friend-based ranking mechanisms.”
In particular, we want to understand how the architecture of the fixed social network
affects the planner’s ability to construct a mechanism having desirable properties.
While we treat the social network as exogenous, we note that in some situations the
planner can design the network endogenously. Consider, for example, peer selection
problems, e.g., when editors of scientific journals ask scholars to review the work
of their peers, or scientific funding agencies ask applicants to review the projects of
other applicants. By assigning reviewers to projects, the planner designs a network
of observation which plays exactly the same role as the exogenous social networks
described above.
We study a setting with three characteristics. First, we assume that information is
local. An individual may make comparisons only among his direct neighbors. Second,
information is ordinal. Individuals lack the ability to quantify characteristics and can
only assess whether one individual has a higher characteristic than another. Third,
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we assume that the planner has only one instrument at her disposal: she constructs a
(complete) ranking of the members of the community. Hence, the number of outcomes
that the planner can select from is very restricted. The planner cannot use transfers,
and cannot punish individuals by excluding them from the ranking. In particular,
she cannot impose punishments for inconsistent reports, as in the classical literature
on implementation with correlated types (Cre´mer and McLean, 1985).
We require that the planner’s mechanism satisfy two properties. First, individuals
must have an incentive to report information truthfully. In the ordinal setting we
consider, the natural choices for implementation concepts are dominant-strategy and
ex post implementation. However, we notice that the limited number of outcomes
in our setting means that dominant-strategy implementation is too strong, leading
to impossibility results. We adopt instead ex post incentive compatibility as the
desirable incentive property of the mechanism.
Second, we require the mechanism to be ex post efficient from the point of view
of the planner, whose objective is to recover the true ranking of individuals in the
community. More precisely, the ranking chosen by the planner must match the rank-
ing that society would construct by aggregating all local information. If society can
construct a complete ranking of individuals for any realization of types (a situation we
label “completely informative”), the ranking chosen by the planner must match the
true ranking. Otherwise, we may face different situations according to the realization
of types. For some type realizations, even if the information aggregated by society
is not complete, transitivity ensures that all individuals can be completely ranked.
For other type realizations, society will be able to construct only a partial order on
the individuals. In the latter case, the complete ranking chosen by the planner will
be a completion of the partial order that the community is able to construct, and
this completion will involve an arbitrary ranking across individuals who cannot be
compared.
We first analyze mechanism design in completely informative societies. We show
that a society is completely informative if every pair of individuals can be compared,
either through “self-reports” (the two individuals involved in the pair report on each
other) or through “friend-based reports” (a third individual observes both individuals
in the pair). Our main theorem shows that self-reports can be used only if they are
backed by the report of a third individual. A mechanism satisfying ex post incentive
compatibility and efficiency exists if and only if every pair of individuals has a common
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neighbor. We then characterize the sparsest network which satisfies this property.
When the number of individuals is odd, this is the “friendship network” of Erdo˝s,
Re´nyi, and So´s (1966), the only network in which every pair of individuals has only
one common friend. This network, also known as the windmill, has one individual
as a hub who connects all other individuals who form pairs. When the number
of individuals is even, this is a variant of the windmill in which one of the “sails”
contains three individuals instead of two. In this network, one individual—the hub—
is responsible for a large number of comparisons.
We then turn our attention to societies which are not completely informative.
We first show that any comparison based solely on self-reports must be discarded by
the planner, as both individuals have an incentive to misreport. Hence, the planner
can rely only on friend-based comparisons, and we construct a “comparison network”
by linking two individuals if and only if they have a common neighbor. We find
that there exist two network architectures for which the planner can construct a
mechanism satisfying ex post incentive compatibility, and efficiency. In the first
architecture, the social network is bipartite (which is equivalent to the comparison
network being disconnected). We use the bipartite structure to partition the set of
individuals, so that individuals in one group rank individuals in the other group, and
individuals are ranked across groups in an arbitrary way. In the second architecture,
all links form triangles, and we can construct a mechanism exploiting the fact that
any unsupported report is surrounded by supported links. However, we also note that
there exist network architectures for which mechanisms satisfying all three properties
named above cannot be constructed. The simplest example is a network of four
individuals with one triangle and one additional link.
We then highlight three aspects of our findings using social network data from
villages in Karnataka, India, and neighborhoods in Indonesia. First, information,
as measured by the share of unique comparisons the planner receives, depends on
network structure. Two social networks of similar density may provide very different
levels of information. Second, we decompose comparisons into those within a triangle,
those across triangles, and a remainder. Low-density networks have a large share of
across-triangle comparisons. Third, we simulate the process of capping the number of
comparisons each individual provides. If the cap is small relative to the community
size, the capped network is close to the upper bound in information (as measured by
the number of unique comparisons).
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Finally, we consider different variants and robustness checks of our model. We
show that dominant-strategy implementation is too strong, leading to an impossibility
result in triangles. We analyze the robustness of our mechanism to joint deviations
by groups. We study whether coarser rankings are easier or harder to implement
than complete rankings. We study the impact of homophily. If individuals of similar
characteristics are more likely to form friendships, the planner is more likely to extract
the necessary and sufficient friend-based comparisons to find the complete ranking.
This relationship is reversed when the probability of across-group links is close to
zero.
In practical terms, our analysis points to two important facts. First, it shows
that it may be useful to partition the set of individuals into different groups and ask
individuals in one group to rank those in another. For example, one may want to let
men rank women and women rank men in a community. This procedure will result in
a truthful and efficient ranking, but the price to be paid is that interrankings among
individuals in the two groups will be arbitrary. Second, our analysis highlights the
importance of triangles. Truthful and efficient comparisons will be possible if all links
form triangles, suggesting that friend-based ranking should be used only in societies
with high level of support. As high levels of support is associated with high density
and low average distances, we conclude that friend-based ranking should be used only
in communities with dense social networks with low diameters. Finally, our analysis
can be used to help design review systems in peer-selection problems. It suggests that
using asymmetric networks of observation, with central reviewers observing a large
number of projects, may be a way to construct efficient and incentive-compatible
peer-review systems.
1.1 Literature Review
We first discuss the relationship of our paper with the literature on community-based
targeting in development economics. In community-based targeting, members of the
community gather at a meeting to decide on a ranking of need to determine who
will receive a social grant. The public nature of the meeting encourages truthful
reports, but only if the number of grants is limited (Rai, 2002). Alatas, Banerjee,
Hanna, Olken, and Tobias (2012) report on a field experiment in Indonesia in which
community-based targeting was compared to proxy-means testing, another popular
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method of targeting. Community-based targeting captures a broader concept of wel-
fare than can be captured by consumption measures and results in greater community
satisfaction with the ranking. Alatas, Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Hanna, and Olken
(2016) use network data collected during the same experiment to show that the infor-
mation people have about fellow community members decreases sharply with social
distance. As a result, networks with high density have less targeting errors from
community-based targeting (relative to a proxy-means test) than networks with low
density.
In contrast to community-based targeting, friend-based ranking mechanisms do
not require the community to gather at a central meeting to aggregate their knowl-
edge. In friend-based ranking, the planner asks each individual to rank his friends
and aggregates the information herself. In a recent field experiment in Maharashtra,
India, Hussam, Rigol, and Roth (2017) employ a friend-based ranking mechanism to
rank entrepreneurs according to marginal returns to capital. The researchers divided
entrepreneurs into groups of four to six according to geographic proximity and asked
each entrepreneur to rank his or her fellow entrepreneurs. Despite entrepreneurs be-
ing placed in small non-overlapping groups, the ranking exercise was more effective
at predicting marginal returns to capital than a machine-learning algorithm using a
wide variety of survey measures.
The theoretical analysis of the paper is closely related to the limited literature
in computer science and social choice theory studying peer selection. Alon, Fischer,
Procaccia, and Tennenholtz (2011) analyze the design of mechanisms to select a group
of k individuals among their peers. Alon, Fischer, Procaccia, and Tennenholtz (2011)
prove a strong negative result: no deterministic efficient strategy-proof mechanism
exists. Approximately efficient, stochastic, impartial mechanisms can be constructed,
which are based on the random partition of individuals into clusters of fixed size
such that individuals inside a cluster rank individuals outside the cluster. Holzman
and Moulin (2013) analyze impartial voting rules when individuals nominate a single
individual for office. They identify a class of desirable voting rules as two-step mech-
anisms, by which voters are first partitioned into districts which elect local winners,
who then compete against one another to select the global winner. However, Holzman
and Moulin (2013) also highlight a number of impossibility results, showing that there
is no impartial voting procedure which treats voters symmetrically, nor any impartial
voting procedure which guarantees (i) that an individual whom nobody considers
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best will never be elected and (ii) that an individual whom everybody considers best
will always be elected. Kurokawa, Lev, Morgenstern, and Procaccia (2015) and Aziz,
Lev, Mattei, Rosenschein, and Walsh (2016) improve on the partition algorithm pro-
posed in Alon, Fischer, Procaccia, and Tennenholtz (2011). They consider a more
general setting, inspired by the new peer-review system instituted by the National
Science Foundation to fund the Sensors and Sensing System program. Kurokawa,
Lev, Morgenstern, and Procaccia (2015) propose the “credible subset mechanism,”
a process which first identifies candidates who are likely to win, and assigns ratings
only to these candidates. Aziz, Lev, Mattei, Rosenschein, and Walsh (2016) propose
a mechanism combining the insights of the partition mechanism of Alon, Fischer,
Procaccia, and Tennenholtz (2011) with the impartial “divide the dollar” mechanism
of De Clippel, Moulin, and Tideman (2008).
Our model departs from all these models of peer selection in a number of ways.
First, we consider ordinal rather than cardinal information as inputs to the mecha-
nism. In our model, individuals do not assign grades to other individuals, but can
only make bilateral comparisons. Second, we consider as output a complete ranking
of individuals rather than a coarse ranking into two sets of acceptable and non ac-
ceptable candidates. (However, in Section 6, we also consider coarser rankings as a
possible extension of our model.) Third, because dominant-strategy mechanisms do
not exist, we weaken the incentive requirement to ex post implementation, thereby
obtaining positive results which differ from the results obtained in the peer-selection
literature. Fourth, and most importantly, we do not assume a specific assignment of
proposals to reviewers, but consider an arbitrary network of observations captured
by a social network. Our main objective is then to characterize those social networks
(or structures of observability) for which mechanisms satisfying desirable properties
can be constructed.
The mechanism we consider is also more distantly connected to the literature
on peer prediction mechanisms initiated by Miller, Resnick, and Zeckhauser (2005).
In a peer-prediction mechanism, there exists an unknown state of the world and
individuals receive independent signals over the true state. Each individual is asked
to report on his type, but receives a payment which depends on the report of another
randomly chosen individual. Miller, Resnick, and Zeckhauser (2005) show that the
peer-prediction method is Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational
when individuals share a common prior. Prelec (2004) extends the analysis when the
7
planner does not know the common prior, and defines the “Bayesian truth serum”
as a mechanism where individuals receive a payment which depends on their report
and on their prediction of the report of all other individuals. (The Bayesian truth
serum mechanism is used by Hussam, Rigol, and Roth (2017) to elicit information
about entrepreneurial abilities.) Prelec (2004) shows that the Bayesian truth serum
mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible when the number of individuals becomes
large. Witkowski and Parkes (2012) propose a robust peer-prediction mechanism,
which does not rely on individuals sharing a common prior and, as opposed to the
Bayesian truth serum, is Bayesian incentive-compatible for small populations.
The setting we consider differs from the setting of peer prediction mechanisms
in several ways. First, we assume that information is local rather than global so
that individuals do not receive a signal on a common state. Second, we assume
that individuals are only able to perform bilateral comparisons and cannot explicitly
report cardinal types. Finally, our analysis emphasizes the importance of the network
of observability rather than scoring rules using the report of other individuals to elicit
information in the community.
The paper which is probably the most closely connected to ours is a recent paper
by Baumann (2017) which analyzes network structures for which it is possible to
identify the individual with the highest characteristic. Baumann (2017) constructs
a specific multitier mechanism identifying the top individual from the reports of his
neighbors. The mechanism admits multiple equilibria, but there are some social net-
work architectures (e.g., the star) for which all equilibria result in the identification of
the top individual. Our paper differs from Baumann’s, however, in many dimensions.
First, we consider an ordinal rather than a cardinal setting, giving rise to the possibil-
ity of incompleteness of the social ranking. Second, we assume that the objective of
the planner is to rank all individuals rather than identify the top individual. Third,
we do not assume an exogenous bound on the way in which individuals can misreport,
in contrast to Baumann (2017), in which this exogenous bound plays a crucial role in
the construction of equilibria.
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2 Model
2.1 Individuals and communities
We consider a communityN of n individuals indexed by i = 1, 2, ..., n. Each individual
i has a characteristic θi ∈ R. Examples of θi include wealth, aptitude for a job,
or quality of a project. Characteristics are privately known and are drawn from a
nonatomic continuous distribution F .
Members of the community are linked by a connected, undirected graph g. The
social network g is common knowledge among the individuals and the planner. The
characteristic of individual i, θi, can be observed by individual i and by all his di-
rect neighbors in the social network g. We suppose that individuals cannot provide
an accurate value for the characteristic θi. Either the characteristic cannot be mea-
sured precisely, or individuals do not have the ability or the language to quantify θi
precisely. Instead, we assume that individuals possess ordinal information and are
able to compare the characteristics of two individuals. For any individual i and any
pair of individuals (j, k) that individual i can observe, we let tijk = 1 if individual
i observes that θj > θk, and t
i
jk = −1 if individual i observes that θj < θk. The
ordinal comparison is assumed to be perfect: individual i always perfectly observes
whether individual j’s characteristic is higher than that of individual k. Given that
the characteristics are drawn from a nonatomic continuous distribution, we ignore
situations in which the two characteristics are equal.
Individual i’s information (and type) can thus be summarized by a matrix T i =
[tijk], where t
i
jk ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and tijk 6= 0 if and only if i observes the comparison
between j and k, namely either i = j or i = k or gijgik = 1. When i = j or i = k, we
call the comparison tijk a self-comparison. When gijgik = 1, we call the comparison
tijk a friend-based comparison.
The vector T = (T 1, .., T n) describes the information possessed by the commu-
nity on the ranking of the characteristics of all the individuals. Obviously, because
individual observations are perfectly correlated, individual types T i and T j will be
correlated if there exists a pair of individuals (k, l) such that tikl 6= 0 and tjkl 6= 0.
Hence, if the planner could construct a punishment for contradictory reports, as in
Cre´mer and McLean (1985), she would be able to induce the individuals to report
their true type. However, we rule out arbitrary punishments.
The information contained in the vector T = (T 1, .., T n) results in a partial rank-
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ing of the characteristics of the individuals, which we denote by . We let i T j if
the information contained in T allows us to conclude that θi > θj.
For a fixed social network g, the information contained in the vectorT = (T 1, .., T n)
may not be the same for different realizations of (θ1, .., θn). This is due to the fact
that (i) new comparisons can be obtained by transitivity but (ii) the transitive clo-
sure of an order relation depends on the initial order relation. To illustrate this point,
consider four individuals i = 1, 2, 3, 4 organized in a line as in Figure 1
1 2 3 4
Figure 1: A line of four individuals
If θ1 < θ2 < θ3 < θ4, then given that t
1
12 = t
2
12 = −1, t223 = t323 = −1, t334 =
t434 = −1, t213 = −1, and t324 = −1, the comparisons result in a complete ranking
1 ≺ 2 ≺ 3 ≺ 4. However, for other possible realizations of (θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4), the ranking
generated by the types T may be incomplete. For example, if θ1 < θ4 < θ2 < θ3, we
obtain 1 ≺ 2 ≺ 3 and 4 ≺ 2 ≺ 3, but 1 and 4 cannot be compared.
A social network g is called completely informative if, for any realization of the
characteristics (θ1, .., θn), the information contained in T results in a complete ranking
of the members of the community. The following lemma characterizes completely
informative social networks.
Lemma 1. A social network g is completely informative if and only if, for any pair
of individuals (i, j) either gij = 1 or there exists an individual k such that gikgjk = 1.
A social network is completely informative if and only if every pair of individuals
can be compared either by self-comparisons or by friend-based comparisons.
2.2 Planner and mechanism design
The objective of the planner is to construct a ranking of individuals according to
the value of the characteristic θi. For example, a charity wishes to rank potential
beneficiaries by need, an employer wants to rank workers according to their ability,
a bank wants to rank projects according to their profitability. We let ρ denote the
complete order chosen by the planner. The set of all complete orders is denoted by
P . The rank of individual i is denoted by ρi.
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The planner wishes to construct a ranking as close as possible to the true ranking
of the values of the characteristic θi. We do not specify the preferences of the planner.
In the ordinal setting that we consider, different measures of distances between rank-
ings can be constructed. Instead of describing explicitly the loss function associated
with differences in rankings, we focus attention on efficient mechanisms. Efficiency
requires that the ranking ρ coincides with the ranking generated by T for any pair of
individuals (i, j) who can be compared under T.
Individuals care only about their rank ρi and have strict preferences over ρi. By
convention, individuals prefer higher values of the ranking. Hence, ρi is preferred to
ρ′i if and only if ρi > ρ
′
i. In particular, we assume that there are no externalities in
the community, and thus, individuals do not derive any reward from high rankings of
friends or low rankings of foes.
A direct mechanism associates to any vector of reported matrices T ∈ T n a
complete ranking ρ ∈ P . We impose the following two conditions on the mechanism:
Ex post incentive compatibility. For any individual i, for any vector of types T =
(T i, T−1), any type T
′i, the following holds
ρi(T) ≥ ρi(T ′i, T−i).
Ex post efficiency. For any vector of types T, and for any pair of individuals i and j,
the following holds
if i T j, then ρi(T) > ρj(T).
We focus on ex post implementation for two reasons. First, because we consider
an ordinal setting, we select a robust implementation concept which does not depend
on the distribution of types. Second, as we show in section 6, the alternative robust
implementation concept—dominant-strategy implementation— is too strong for our
setting.
Ex post efficiency requires that the planner’s ranking coincide with the true rank-
ing of characteristics in a very weak sense. Whenever two individuals i and j can be
ranked using the information contained in T, the ranking ρi must be consistent with
the ranking between i and j. As the order relation induced by T, T, may be very
incomplete, the requirement may be very weak. The ranking ρ must be a completion
of the ranking T. If T is a very small subset of N2, the ranking ρ may end up being
very different from the true ranking of the values of the characteristic θi. However as
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the true ranking of characteristics cannot be constructed using the local information
from the social network, the difference between ρ and the true ranking should not
be a matter of concern, since the planner chooses an efficient mechanism given the
information available to the community.
3 Completely informative rankings
3.1 Importance of common friends
We first analyze conditions under which an ex post incentive-compatible and efficient
mechanism can be constructed when the information available in the community
results in a complete ranking. By Lemma 1, all pairs of individuals must either
be directly connected, or observed by a third individual. The next theorem shows
that for an ex post incentive-compatible and efficient mechanism to exist, all pairs of
individuals must be observed by a third individual.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the social network g is completely informative. An ex
post incentive-compatible and efficient mechanism exists if and only if, for all pair
of individuals (i, j), there exists a third individual k who observes both i and j, i.e.,
gikgjk = 1.
Theorem 1 shows that an ex post incentive-compatible and efficient mechanism
exists in completely informative communities if and only if every pair of individuals
(i, j) has a common friend k. Self-comparisons cannot be used. Every comparison
requires the presence of a third party. If the two individuals i and j are connected,
the link ij must be ‘supported’ by a third individual, following the terminology of
Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Tan (2012).
The intuition underlying Theorem 1 is easy to grasp. If the comparison between
θi and θj can be reported only by i and j, in an ex post efficient mechanism, one
of them has an incentive to lie. Consider a ranking which places i and j as the two
individuals with the lowest characteristics in the community. If both announce that
θi is smaller than θj, then ρi = 1, ρj = 2. Similarly, if both announce that θj is
smaller than θi, then ρj = 1, ρi = 2. But by incentive compatibility, neither of the
individuals can improve his rank by changing his report on tij. Hence i must still
be ranked at position 1 when he announces θi > θj and j announces θi < θj, and
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similarly individual j must still be ranked at position 1 when he announces θj > θi and
individual i announces θi > θj. As two individuals cannot occupy the same position
in the ranking, this contradiction shows that there is no ex post incentive-compatible
and efficient mechanism relying on self-reports. Notice that this impossibility result
stems from the fact that the planner has a very small number of outcomes at her
disposal. If she could impose any arbitrary punishment (for example by excluding
all individuals who provide inconsistent reports), she could implement an ex post
efficient mechanism in dominant strategies, as in Cre´mer and McLean (1985), for any
network architecture.
The construction of an ex post incentive-compatible and efficient mechanism when
all links are supported is very intuitive. First consider a comparison between i and
j which is observed by at least three individuals. The mechanism disregards the
report of any individual who deviates from the reports of all other individuals. Hence
no individual can unilaterally change the outcome of the mechanism when all other
individuals report the truth. Next suppose that the comparison between i and j is
dictated by a third party, a common friend k of i and j. A change in reports could not
improve the rank of k given that all other individuals tell the truth and that the social
network is completely informative. If the change in report creates an inconsistency in
the ranking, the planner can detect if a single individual has cheated and punish him
by ranking him at the worst position in the ranking. If the change in report does not
create a violation in transitivity, because the social network is completely informative,
the rank of individual k is fully determined by the reports of other individuals in the
community. The rank of individual k is fixed and no change in report can improve
the position of individual k in the ranking. This “friend-based” ranking mechanism
is ex post incentive-compatible and efficient.
Theorem 1 characterizes communities for which friend-based ranking mechanisms
can be constructed. Clearly the complete network satisfies the conditions. However,
the condition is also satisfied by many other social networks, which are less dense than
the complete network. Our next result characterizes the sparsest networks for which
the condition of Theorem 1 holds. This characterization is based on the “friendship
theorem” of Erdo˝s, Re´nyi, and So´s (1966).
Theorem 2. (The “friendship theorem”) If G is a graph of order n in which any two
vertices i and j have one neighbor in common, then n = 2m + 1 and G contains m
triangles which are connected at a common vertex.
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The “friendship theorem”, initially stated and proved in Erdo˝s, Re´nyi, and So´s
(1966), asserts that in any community where every pair of individuals has exactly
one friend in common, the number of individuals (the “order” of the graph) needs
to be odd and one individual is friends with everyone and is the common friend of
all other individuals.1 The “friendship graph” is illustrated in Figure 2 for n = 7.
For obvious reasons, it is also called the “windmill graph”. The friendship graph has
exactly 3m edges. Our next theorem shows that this is actually the smallest number
of edges for which a completely informative mechanism can be constructed when n is
odd. When n is even, the graph which minimizes the number of edges is a variation
of the friendship graph, where one of the sails of the windmill contains three vertices,
as illustrated in Figure 2 for n = 8.
(i) n = 7. For odd number of nodes,
the windmill is also called a friend-
ship graph.
(ii) n = 8. For even number of nodes
the windmill is modified and one sail
has three nodes.
Figure 2: Windmill graphs
Theorem 3. Suppose that n ≥ 3. Let g be a social network for which friend-based
ranking generates a complete ranking. Then g must contain at least 3n
2
−1 links if n is
even and 3(n−1)
2
links is n is odd. If n is odd, the unique sparsest network architecture
is the friendship network. If n is even, the unique sparsest network architecture is a
modified windmill network where one of the sails contains three nodes i, j, k such that
i, j and k are connected to the hub, i is connected to j and j is connected to k.
Theorem 3 establishes a lower bound on the number of edges needed to obtain a
complete ranking of the community. It also identifies the unique network architecture
1Different proofs of the friendship theorem have been proposed, often using complex combinatorial
arguments (Wilf, 1971; Longyear and Parsons, 1972; Huneke, 2002).
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which reaches this lower bound: a windmill network where one of the nodes, the hub,
connects all other nodes which form pairs.2 This network architecture implies a very
unequal distribution of degrees. The hub is connected to all nodes, whereas the
remaining nodes have degree two or three. If individuals have a limited capacity to
compare other individuals, the windmill network cannot be used, and one needs to
resort to other more symmetric network architectures involving a larger number of
links. An exact characterization of the minimal degree of a regular network for which
all links can be supported remains an open question in graph theory.3
4 Incomplete rankings and friend-based compar-
isons
4.1 Comparison networks
We now consider communities where the condition of Theorem 1 fails. The condition
fails either when the community is completely informative but some comparisons are
based only on self-reports or because the community is not completely informative.
In the latter case, there exist some type profiles T for which individuals collectively
cannot construct a complete ranking. We let i ./T j denote the fact that i and
j cannot be compared using the information contained in T. As the mechanism ρ
defines a complete ranking, it must choose an arbitrary ranking between i and j at
T. We first show that if the comparison between some pair of individuals i and j
relies on self-reports, the mechanism ρ cannot simultaneously satisfy ex post incentive
compatibility and efficiency.
Proposition 1. Suppose that there exists a pair of individuals (i, j) such that gij = 1
but there is no individual k such that gikgjk = 1. Then there exists no mechanism
satisfying ex post incentive compatibility and efficiency.
2The proof of the theorem is very different from known proofs of the Friendship Theorem, mostly
because we focus attention on the minimization of the number of edges rather than on the construc-
tion of a graph where any intersection of neighborhoods is a singleton.
3A family of regular graphs, called the rook graphs, satisfy the property. For an integer m ≥ 2,
rook graphs are regular graphs of degree 2(m− 1) among m2 nodes, and have the property that any
two connected nodes have m − 2 nodes in common and every pair of unconnected nodes has two
common neighbors. See Brouwer and Haemers (2011) for more details on rook graphs.
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Proposition 1 extends the necessity argument of Theorem 1 to show that the
planner cannot construct an ex post incentive-compatible and efficient mechanism
when two individuals provide self-reports. Hence truthful comparisons based on self-
reports cannot be elicited. The planner must thus ignore comparisons based on
self-reports. We now analyze which comparisons can be obtained by the planner, or
equivalently, characterize communities which are not completely informative for which
the planner can construct a mechanism satisfying ex post incentive compatibility and
efficiency.
To this end, we first modify the type of individual i, Ti by removing any comparison
tiij which is not supported by a third individual, i.e., we let t
i
ij = 0 if there exists no k 6=
i, j such that tkij 6= 0. Second, we construct a comparison network h which captures
all comparisons that can be obtained using friend-based comparisons. Formally, we
let hij = 1 if and only if there exists k such that gikgjk = 1. The network h collects
all pairs of individuals which can be compared by a third individual. It differs from
the social network g in two ways: (i) pairs of individuals which are linked in g but do
not have a common friend appear in g but not in h, (ii) pairs of individuals which are
not directly linked in g but have a common friend appear in h but not in g. Figure
3 illustrates a social network g and the corresponding comparison network h.
(i) Social network g
(ii) Comparison network h
Figure 3: Social and comparison networks
The comparison network h is the set of bilateral comparisons that the planner
can guarantee by excluding self-reports. The planner complements the comparisons
contained in h by taking their transitive closure. If the conditions of Theorem 1 hold,
the comparison network h is the complete network. When the conditions fail, we
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characterize comparison networks which can be supported by a mechanism satisfying
ex post incentive compatibility and efficiency.
4.2 Connected comparison networks and bipartite social net-
works
We first provide a characterization of social networks which generate connected com-
parison networks.
Proposition 2. Suppose that n ≥ 3. The comparison network h is connected if and
only if g is not bipartite.
Proposition 2 establishes that the network h is connected if and only if the social
network g is not bipartite. If the network g is not bipartite, we construct a path
connecting any pair of individuals i and j in the comparison network. If the network
g is bipartite, and the nodes partitioned into the two sets A and B, the comparison
network h is disconnected into two components: individuals in A rank individuals in
B and individuals in B rank individuals in A. Individuals can be ranked inside the
two sets A and B but rankings of individuals across the two sets must be arbitrary.
Notice however that an individual in A cannot improve his ranking by lying about the
ranking of individuals in B. Hence, when the social network g is bipartite (and the
comparison network h disconnected), it is easy to construct a mechanism satisfying
ex post incentive compatibility and efficiency.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the social network g is bipartite with two sets of nodes
A and B. Then there exists a mechanism satisfying ex post incentive compatibility and
efficiency, which generates a ranking which coincides with the comparison network h
on its two components A and B.
Proposition 3 characterizes one situation where the planner can elicit information
about comparisons: when the set of individuals in the community can be partitioned
into two subsets where members of one subset observe members of the other subset.
For example, one could survey separately men and women and ask men about the
characteristics of women and women about the characteristics of men. However,
this design would not allow the planner to obtain information about the ranking of
individuals across the two sets. The mechanism completes the partial ranking by
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an arbitrary ranking across individuals in the two sets, possibly resulting in a final
ranking which is very different from the true ranking. We observe that the partition
of the set of nodes into groups which rank each other is the basis of most algorithms
proposed in the computer science literature on peer selection.
4.3 Supported links in incompletely informative communi-
ties
We now consider communities for which the comparison network h is connected but
not complete. We provide a sufficient condition under which the planner can con-
struct a mechanism satisfying ex post incentive compatibility and efficiency. The
mechanism is an extension of the mechanism constructed in the proof of Proposition
1 for completely informative communities.
Proposition 4. Suppose that all links in g are supported (for all i, j such that gij = 1,
there exists a k such that gikgjk = 1). Then there exists a mechanism satisfying ex
post incentive compatibility and efficiency.
Figure 4: A supported social network g
Proposition 4 identifies social networks which allow the planner to construct an
incomplete ranking of the individuals: all links must be supported and the social
network is thus formed of a collection of triangles. This is the structure of communities
identified in Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Tan (2012) where all social links are
supported. Figure 4 illustrates one of these networks. Notice that some comparisons
are supported as links within the triangles, and other comparisons are supported as
links across triangles. Links across triangles do not play a role in Jackson, Rodriguez-
Barraquer, and Tan (2012) favor exchange context.
Whether there exist other social networks g generating connected comparison net-
works h for which the planner can construct a mechanism satisfying ex post incentive
compatibility and ex post efficiency remains an open question. However, there are
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social networks for which the planner will not be able to construct a mechanism
satisfying these three properties, as shown in the following example.
Example 1. Let n = 4. individuals i, j, k are connected in a triangle and individual
l is connected to i. 4
i
j k l
Figure 5: A social network g where a mechanism does not exist
In this example, the links (i, j), (i, k), (j, k) are supported, but the link (i, l) is not
supported. Consider a realization of the characteristics such that θl > θj > θi > θk.
If individual i announces θl > θj > θk, by ex post efficiency, the planner constructs
the rankings k, i, j, l and the rank of individual i must be equal to 2. If on the other
hand individual i announces θj > θk > θl, the planner constructs the ranking l, k, i, j
and the ranking of individual i is now equal to 3. Hence individual i has an incentive
to lie and announce θj > θk > θl.
In Example 1, the planner’s ranking of i depends on his announcement on the
rankings (j, l) and (k, l). Given that θj > θi > θk, and that (i, j, k) form a triangle, the
planner must rank i between j and k. Hence she cannot rank all three individuals j, k
and l on the same side of individual i, as in the mechanism constructed in the proof of
Proposition 4. But then, the announcement of individual i on (j, k, l), by changing the
rank of l with respect to j and k, will also affect the ranking of individual i. Because
individual i can manipulate his rank by his announcements on the unsupported links
(j, k) and (j, l), there is no mechanism satisfying ex post incentive compatibility and
efficiency in this community.
5 Real-life social networks
In the two previous sections, we analyzed conditions on social networks under which
the planner can construct rankings that satisfy ex post incentive compatibility and
efficiency. We use real social network data from India (Banerjee, Chandrasekhar,
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Duflo, and Jackson, 2013) and Indonesia (Alatas, Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Hanna,
and Olken, 2016) to highlight three implications of our theoretical results. We first
observe that the information obtained in a social network does not depend only on the
number of links. For a given density of the social network, we witness a large variation
in the information obtained by friend-based ranking, depending on the exact structure
of the network. Second, we analyze the role played in friend-based comparisons by
supported links and links across triangles. For low-density networks, we show that
links across triangles provide the majority of the friend-based comparisons. Third,
we analyze how cognitive limitations affect the number of comparisons elicited by the
planner. We cap the number of comparisons per individual and observe that when
the cap is small relative to the community size, the information loss due to the cap
is also small.
The data from India and Indonesia are particularly useful because they contain
multiple independent networks: 75 villages from Karnataka, India, and 633 neigh-
borhoods from three provinces in Indonesia. Indonesian networks are smaller and
denser than the Indian networks. We focus on the giant component of each network.
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the networks. We report the mean, minimum,
and maximum for each measure. The combined sample of networks provides a large
range in network size and structure. We measure information using the density of the
comparison network, which is simply the count of unique comparisons as a share of
the n(n−1)
2
possible comparisons.
Figure 7 provides further detail on the distribution of network characteristics. No-
tice that the Indonesian networks are denser and more clustered, and display shorter
average distances than the Indian networks. As a result, the Indonesian networks
contain more information, i.e., result in denser comparison networks.
Figure 7 shows a tight relationship between average distance and the quantity of
information. Since every comparison (i, j) is provided by a path of length 2 between
i and j, this relationship is not surprising. In contrast to the relation between in-
formation and average distance, the relationship between information and density is
not tight. In the following section we use an example to highlight two reasons for the
variation in the quantity of information at a given density.
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5.1 Large variation in the quantity of information for a given
density
Dense social networks provide many comparisons, but density is not a good proxy for
the quantity of information that the planner can extract from a social network. The
windmill of Theorem 3 is completely informative but its density is only 3
n
. This insight
also applies to the data here. In the bottom left panel of Figure 8, we plot the density
against the quantity of information for social networks of more than 50 households
in the giant component. We highlight two networks and plot their corresponding
network diagrams. The orange network, from India, has 75 nodes and a density of
0.12. The green network, from Indonesia, has 69 nodes and the same density of 0.12.
Despite having equal density, the orange network provides a quantity of information
of 0.62—nearly double the green network with 0.33.
Two factors contribute to the greater amount of information in the orange network.
First, as shown in the top right panel of Figure 8, the degree distribution of the orange
is spread more widely than the green. The number of comparisons provided by a single
node is a convex function of degree. For a given density, the greater the spread in the
degree distribution, the more comparisons the social network provides.
Second, the green network is a combination of cliques that are weakly connected to
each other. Cliques repeat comparisons. Take a clique of seven nodes as an example.
These seven nodes provide 105 comparisons yet 84 of these comparisons are repeated
ones. Since the green and orange networks have a similar number of nodes and equal
density, they each produce a total number of comparisons similar to the other’s. The
difference is that a greater share of the green network’s comparisons are repeated.
This example shows that the success of friend-based ranking depends not only on the
number of links, but, more importantly, on how those links are structured.
5.2 Decomposition of information
Proposition 4 (in Section 4) shows the importance of triangles in constructing incentive-
compatible and efficient mechanisms. Both the links within and across triangles are
used to obtain truthful comparisons. For a given network we can decompose infor-
mation into comparisons provided within and across triangles.
We approach the decomposition by removing all unsupported links from the net-
work and recalculating the quantity of information. The resulting supported network
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is incentive-compatible but information is reduced—from 0.37 to 0.27 on average for
India and from 0.70 to 0.63 on average for Indonesia. A greater share of the Indone-
sian links is supported, which is due to the fact that those networks are denser and
more clustered.
We decompose the comparisons in the supported network into those within and
across triangles. If a comparison appears both within and across a triangle, we cat-
egorize the comparison as “within.” Figure 9 shows the decomposition for 50 Indian
and 50 Indonesian networks. Each bar corresponds to a network and the bar is split
between within triangles, across triangles, and a remainder (i.e., the comparisons
which appear only in the unsupported network). At lower densities the majority
of comparisons are provided across triangles, while as density of the social network
increases, the share of comparisons within triangles increases.
5.3 Capping comparisons
For a given degree distribution, we can define a simple upper bound on the number
of bilateral comparisons. Since we measure information by counting links in the
comparison network, an upper bound on information is reached when none of the
bilateral comparisons produced in the social network is repeated. With the degree
of individual i denoted as di, the upper bound is
∑n
i=1
di(di−1)
n(n−1 , which is simplified to
d(d−1)
n−1 for regular networks of degree d.
To analyze the effect of capping the degree of individuals on the quantity of
information, we use simulations on the social network data. For each individual i, we
randomly pick five friends whom i will compare to each other. The resulting network
is directed. Suppose j picks i and i has more than five friends. There is no guarantee
that i will also pick j. Figure 10 uses the mean from 100 iterations to measure the
number of nonrepeated comparisons in the capped network. The standard deviation
is less than .01 for any given network in our sample. This variation depends on the
starting network.
The capped information is close to the upper bound. In Figure 10 we contrast
the upper bound to the mean information provided by the capped networks. Each
bar represents a network capped at degree 5. When the cap is small relative to the
community size (i.e., the number of households), only a small share of the comparisons
in the capped network is repeated, so that the capped information is close to the upper
22
bound.
6 Robustness and extensions
The analysis of friend-based ranking mechanisms relies on specific assumptions on
the model. In this section, we relax some of these assumptions to test the robustness
of our results.
6.1 Dominant strategy implementation
We first strengthen the incentive compatibility requirement to dominant-strategy im-
plementation. The following proposition shows that dominant-strategy implementa-
tion is too strong in our setting. The outcome set is not rich enough to permit the
construction of strategy-proof mechanisms. We first recall the definition of strategy-
proofness:
Strategy-proofness. For any individual i, for any vector of announcements (Tˆ−i) and
any types T i, T
′i,
ρi(T
i, Tˆ−i) ≥ ρi(T ′i, Tˆ−i).
Proposition 5. Let g be a triangle. There exists no mechanism satisfying strategy-
proofness and ex post efficiency.
Proposition 5 is an impossibility result, highlighting a conflict between strategy-
proofness and efficiency in a very simple network architecture. As shown in the proof,
the impossibility stems from the coarseness of the outcome space, which limits the
power of the planner. There are only three possible outcomes corresponding to the
three possible ranks. Strategy-proofness imposes a large number of constraints on
the mechanism. We show, using a combinatorial argument, that if all the constraints
are satisfied, two individuals must be occupying the same rank for some vectors of
announcement. Hence, it is impossible to elicit truthful information in a complete
network with three individuals.4
4The extension of this impossibility result to more than three individuals remains an open ques-
tion.
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6.2 Coarse rankings
We next relax the assumption that the planner chooses a complete ranking and that
individuals have strict preferences over ranks. We consider a setting where the planner
selects only broad indifference classes. This is the typical situation in which the
planner selects a set of recipients of the benefits of social programs, or of research
funds. If the planner only chooses broad categories, she might be able to construct
ex post incentive-compatible and efficient mechanisms even if self-reports are not
supported by a third individual. The intuition is immediate: if there exist two “worst
spots” in the ranking, the planner can punish individuals who send conflicting self-
reports by placing both of them on the worst spot. We formalize this intuition in the
following proposition.
Proposition 6. There exists an ex post incentive-compatible and efficient mechanism
in any completely informative community if and only if the planner can place two
individuals in the worst spot, i.e., if and only if any individual i is indifferent between
ρ(i) = 1 and ρ(i) = 2.
Proposition 6 thus shows that it is easier to construct ex post incentive-compatible
and efficient mechanisms when the planner does not construct a complete ranking
of the individuals. This observation raises new possibilities. It may be possible
to construct strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms when the planner only assigns
individuals to broad categories.
6.3 Group incentive compatibility
We now allow for individuals to jointly deviate from truth-telling. We let individuals
coordinate their reports and jointly misreport their types.
Consider a triangle with three individuals. Each individual reports on the three
links. The mechanism that we constructed in Theorem 1 of Section 3 assigns a
ranking ρ(i) > ρ(j) when at least two of the individuals report that i is higher than
j. This creates an incentive for any pair of individuals to misrepresent their types.
For example, if the true ranking is θ3 > θ2 > θ1, individuals 1 and 2 have an incentive
to misreport and announce that 2 is higher than 1, and 1 is higher than 3, so that in
the end, ρ(2) = 3 > 2 and ρ(1) = 2 > 1.
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This intuition can be exploited to show that there does not exist any mechanism
satisfying ex post group-incentive compatibility and efficiency when n = 3. We first
provide a formal definition of ex post group-incentive compatibility:
Ex post group incentive compatibility. For any vector of types T, there does not
exist a coalition S and a vector of types T
′S such that for all individuals i in S,
ρi(T
′S,TS) ≥ ρi(T)
and
ρi(T
′S,TS) > ρi(T).
for some i ∈ S.
Proposition 7. Let g be a triangle. There does not exist a mechanism satisfying ex
post group-incentive compatibility and efficiency.
6.4 Homophily
In this last extension, we analyze the effect of homophily on friend-based ranking.
Homophily is the tendency for individuals to form links with those who are similar
to themselves. We show that moderate levels of homophily increase the likelihood of
extracting a complete ranking whereas extreme homophily has the opposite effect.
In our setting, individuals differ only according to their private characteristic θ so
we model homophily by dividing the community into two equal size groups according
to θ (poor and rich, low ability and high ability, etc.). We assume individuals form
within group links with probability pw and across group links with probability pa
(which is Golub and Jackson’s (2012) islands model with two groups). Homophily
increases as pw grows larger than pa.
The matrix below shows the probability of links for a community of six individuals
where individuals {1, 2, 3} are the low θ group and {4, 5, 6} are the high θ group. The
link between 1 and 2 is within group so this link forms with probability pw while the
link between 1 and 4 is across group so forms with probability pa.
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g =

1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0 pw pw pa pa pa
2 0 pw pa pa pa
3 0 pa pa pa
4 0 pw pw
5 0 pw
6 0

The planner receives a comparison between a pair of individuals if there exists
a third individual who is friends with both individuals in the pair. In the example
above, the probability of observing the comparison (1, 2) is Pr[∃ k 6= 1, 2 : g1k =
g2k = 1] = 1− ((1− p2w)(1− p2a)3). We can generalize this calculation to a community
of n individuals with two equal size groups. For i and j within the same group,
Pr[∃ k 6= i, j : gik = gjk = 1] = 1 − (1 − p2w)
n
2
−2(1 − p2a)
n
2 . For i and j in different
groups, Pr[∃ k 6= i, j : gik = gjk = 1] = 1− (1− pwpa)n−2.
In a community of n individuals, n − 1 comparisons are necessary and sufficient
to determine the complete ranking. The lowest is compared to the second lowest,
the second to the third, and so on. Notice that all of these comparisons except for
one are within group comparisons. The probability of observing these comparisons
simultaneously defines the probability of deriving the complete ranking.
Pr[Complete ranking] =
(
1− (1− p2w)
n
2
−2(1− p2a)
n
2
)n−2(
1− (1− pwpa)n−2
)
Keeping pa constant, if we increase pw, Pr[Complete ranking] will increase because
we have raised the expected number of links. We need to keep the expected number of
links constant to isolate the impact of homophily. There are n− 2 within group links
for every n across group links. Starting from a zero homophily base of p = pw = pa,
we can analyze the impact of homophily by increasing pw and decreasing pa to keep
the expected number of links constant. Let pw = p + η, where η is the homophily
parameter. To keep the number of links constant, pa = p− η nn−2 .
From a base of η = 0 we can increase η and observe how Pr[Complete ranking]
responds. This is represented graphically in Figure 6 for a community size n =
200 and a base probability of friendship p = 0.15. Along the horizontal axis, as η
increases from 0 to around 0.1 the probability of observing the comparisons needed
to derive the complete ranking increases. Intuitively, as homophily increases the
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probability that some individual k is friends with two individuals in the same group
increases while the probability that k is friends with two individuals in different
groups decreases. Since nearly all of the required comparisons are pairs within the
same group, Pr[Complete ranking] rises with homophily.
However, notice that for η > 0.12 the Pr[Complete ranking] drops sharply and
approaches zero. The drop is driven by pa approaching zero. Even though the rank-
ing relies primarily on within group links (pw), there is always one comparison that
depends on the across group links (pa). The highest in the low group must be com-
pared to the lowest in the high group. In our function above, as pa approaches zero
the term 1 − (1 − pwpa)n−2 approaches zero and therefore Pr[Complete ranking] ap-
proaches zero. Moderate levels of homophily improves friend-based ranking whereas
extreme homophily worsens friend-based ranking.
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Figure 6: Impact of homophily (p = 0.15, n = 200)
7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the design of mechanisms to rank individuals in communities in
which individuals have only local, ordinal information on the characteristics of their
neighbors. In these communities, pooling the information of all individuals may not
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be sufficient to obtain a complete ranking, and so we distinguish between completely
informative communities and communities where only incomplete social rankings can
be obtained.
In completely informative communities, we show that the planner can construct an
ex post incentive-compatible and ex post efficient mechanism if and only if each pair
of individuals is observed by a third individual, i.e., the individuals in each pair have
a common friend. We use this insight to characterize the sparsest social network for
which a complete ranking exists as constituting a “friendship network” (or “windmill
network”) in the sense of Erdo˝s, Re´nyi, and So´s (1966).
When the social network is not completely informative, we show that any self-
report which is not supported by a third party must be discarded. We provide
two sufficient conditions on the social network under which an ex post incentive-
compatible and ex post efficient mechanism may be constructed.
First, in bipartite networks, individuals on one side of the network can be used
to rank individuals on the other side, resulting in an ex post efficient but incomplete
ranking. Second, in “social quilts,” where all links are supported in triangles, the
planner can use the congruence of reports to construct truthful rankings over any
pair of individuals.
We use data on social networks from India and Indonesia to illustrate the results
of the theoretical analysis. We measure information provided by the social network as
the share of unique comparisons which can be obtained by friend-based comparisons
(which corresponds to the density of the comparison network) and show that (i)
information varies greatly even for a given density, (ii) across-triangle comparisons
are important at low densities, and (iii) information is close to an upper bound when
the degree is capped at a small value relative to the community size.
Finally, we discuss robustness and extensions of the model, focusing on strategy-
proofness, group-incentive compatibility, coarse rankings, and homophily.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to analyze this intriguing
theoretical problem—the design of a mechanism constructing a complete ranking
when individuals have local, ordinal information based on a social network. In future
work, we would like to further our understanding of the problem, by considering in
more detail the difference between ordinal and cardinal information, between complete
and coarse rankings, and between different concepts of implementation. We also plan
to extend the empirical and policy implications of the theoretical model by analyzing
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specific institutional settings in more detail.
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A Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics of social networks
India Indonesia
Networks 75 622
Number of households 198.72 [77, 356] 52.85 [11, 263]
Share in giant component .95 [.85, .99] .65 [.22, 1.00]
Average degree 9.34 [6.82, 13.83] 17.96 [2.00, 218.00]
Density .05 [.02, .12] .53 [.10, 1.00]
Average clustering .26 [.16, .45] .82 [.48, 1.00]
Average distance 2.75 [2.30, 3.32] 1.77 [1.00, 4.32]
Information .37 [.18, .62] .78 [.25, 1.00]
Notes: Means are reported with minimum and maximum in brackets. Information is measured by the density of the
comparison network. All statistics (except the number of households) are calculated on the giant component. Data
is sourced from Banerjee et al. (2013) for India and Alatas et al. (2016) for Indonesia.
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Figure 7: Distribution of social network measures
Note: Social networks from India (in orange) and Indonesia (in green). Information is
measured as the density of the comparison network.
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Figure 8: Large variation of information for a given density
Note: The bottom left panel shows a scatter-plot of information and density for networks
of more than 50 households in the giant component. Two networks of similar density
are highlighted by orange and green points on the scatter plots. The network diagrams
corresponding to those two points are plotted in the top left and bottom right panel. The
degree distribution of the highlighted networks is shown in the top right panel.
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Figure 9: Decompose information
Note: We decompose information (unique comparisons) into comparisons which are pro-
vided within triangles, across triangles, and a remainder. By Proposition 4 all within and
across triangle comparisons are incentive-compatible. Comparisons within the remainder
may not be incentive-compatible.
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Figure 10: Capping comparisons at 5 friends
Note: Each bar represents a single network on which we simulate a cap on degree. Each
individual provides comparisons of at most 5 friends, selected uniformly at random when
the cap is binding. An upper bound equal to sum of unique and repeated comparisons
is given as a function of the degree distribution. The split between unique and repeated
comparisons is calculated as the mean after 100 iterations.
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C Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
The condition is obviously sufficient, as it guarantees that for any pair (i, j) there
exists an individual k such that tkij 6= 0, Hence the matrix generated by (T 1, .., T n)
contains nonzero entries everywhere outside the diagonal. Conversely, suppose that
there exists a pair of individuals (i, j) who is observed by no other player and such
that gij = 0. Consider a realization of the characteristics such that θi and θj are
two consecutive values. No individual can directly compare i and j. In addition,
because there is no k such that θk ∈ (θi, θj), there is no k such that θi ≺ θk ≺ θj or
θj ≺ θk ≺ θi. Hence the social network g is not completely informative.
Proof of Theorem 1
Sufficiency. Suppose that for any pair of individuals (i, j), there exists a third in-
dividual k for whom gik = gjk = 1. We define the mechanism ρ by constructing
comparisons. Let rij denote the comparison between i and j chosen by the planner.
First consider a pair of individuals (i, j) who observe each other, gij = 1. By
assumption, there are at least three reports on the ranking of i and j. If all individuals
transmit the same report tij, let rij = tij. If all individuals but one transmit the same
report tij and one individual reports t
′
ij = −tij, ignore the ranking t′ij and let rij = tij.
In all other cases, let rij = 1 if and only if i > j.
Second consider a pair of individuals (i, j) who do not observe each other, gij = 0.
By assumption, there exists at least one individual k who observes them both. If there
are at least three individuals who observe i and j, use as above a mechanism such
that rij = tij if all individuals agree on tij or only one individual chooses t
′
ij = −tij,
and let rij = 1 if i > j otherwise.
If one or two individuals observe i, j, pick the individual k with the highest index.
Consider the vector of announcements T˜−k where one disregards the announcements
of individual k. Let T˜−k be the binary relation created by letting tij = 1 if and only
if tlij = 1 for all l 6= k. If there exists a directed path of length greater or equal to 2
between i and j in T˜−k , and for all directed paths between i and j in T˜−k , i0, .., iL
we have tilil+1 = 1, then rij = 1. If on the other hand for all directed paths between i
and j in T˜−k , tilil+1 = −1, then rij = −1. In all other cases, let individual k dictate
the comparison between i and j, rij = t
k
ij.
Now consider all comparisons rij. If they induce a transitive binary relation on
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N , let ρ be the complete order generated by the comparisons. Otherwise, consider all
shortest cycles generated by the binary relation rij. If there exists a single individual
i who dictates at least two comparisons in all shortest cycles, individual i is punished
by setting ρi = 1 and ρj > ρk if and only if j > k for all j, k 6= i. If this is not the
case, pick the arbitrary ranking where ρi > ρj if and only if i > j.
We now show that the mechanism ρ is ex post incentive-compatible and ex post
efficient.
Suppose that all individuals except k report their true type, and consider indi-
vidual k’s incentive to report T
′k 6= T k. On any link (i, j) such that gij = 1, as
all other individuals make the same announcement, individual k cannot change the
comparison rij by misreporting.
Consider a link (i, j) such that gij = 0 and gikgjk = 1. If there are at least three
individuals who observe i and j, individual k cannot affect the outcome. Otherwise,
if there is a directed path of length greater than equal to 2 in T˜−k , individual k’s
report cannot change the ranking. If individual k is not the highest ranked individual
who observes i and j, then she cannot change the comparison rij by misreporting.
Hence we only need to focus attention on pairs (i, j) such that k is the highest index
individual who observes i and j and there is no directed path between i and j in
T˜−k .
Suppose that all individuals l 6= k announce the truth, so that T˜−k=T−k . We
first show that individual k cannot gain by making an announcement which induces
cycles in the ranking generated by the comparisons rij. Suppose that the ranking
generated by rij exhibits cycles. We first claim that the shortest cycles must be of
length 3.
Suppose that there exists a cycle of length L, i0, i1, .., iL. Because the community
is completely informative, the binary comparisons generated by the announcements
are complete, so that for any l,m, either rilim = 1 or rilim = −1. Now consider
i0, i1, i2. If ri0i2 = −1, i0, i1i2i0 forms a shortest cycle of length 3. If not, ri0i2 = 1 and
we can construct a cycle of length L − 1, i0i2, .., iL. By repeating this argument, we
either find shortest cycles of length 3 or end up reducing the initial cycle to a cycle
of length 3.
Consider next a shortest cycle of ijli. We claim that individual k must dictate at
least two comparisons in the cycle.
First note that if k does not dictate the comparison between i and j, there must
37
be a directed path between i and j in T−k . To see this, notice that either gij = 1
and then i T−k j or gij = 0 but i and j are not observed by k or are observed by k
and another individual with a higher index than k, in which case i T−k j. Finally,
it could be that gij = 0, i and j are observed by k, k is the highest index individual
observing i and j, but then as k does not dictate the comparison (i, j), there must
exist a directed path of length 2 between i and j in T−k .
Now suppose first that k does not dictate any comparison in the cycle. There must
exist a directed path between i and j, j and l and l and i inT−k , a contradiction since,
as all individuals tell the truth, the binary relation generated by T−k is transitive.
Next suppose that k dictates a single comparison (i, j) in the cycle but not the
comparisons (j, l) and (l, i). Then there exists a directed path between j and l and a
directed path between l and i in T−k . Hence there exists a directed path of length
greater than or equal to 2 between j and i in T−k . Furthermore, as all individuals
tell the truth, for all directed paths between j and i, rji = 1. Hence the mechanism
cannot let individual k dictate the choice between i and j, yielding a contradiction.
We conclude that all shortest cycles are of length 3, and that in any cycle of
length 3, individual k must dictate at least two of the three comparisons. Hence the
mechanism assigns ρ(k) = 1 and individual k cannot benefit from inducing a cycle.
Finally suppose that all comparisons rij result in a transitive relation so that ρ
can be constructed as the complete order generated by these comparisons. We claim
that the comparisons generated by T−k are sufficient to compute the rank of k. In
fact, for any i 6= k, either gik = 1 and as all other individual tell the truth, rik is
independent of the report tkik, or gik = 0 and the report on (i, k) is truthfully made
by another individual l. In both cases, the information contained in T−k is sufficient
to construct the comparison rik. Hence ρk is independent of the announcement T
k,
concluding the proof that the mechanism is ex post incentive-compatible.
To show that the mechanism is ex post efficient notice that, when all individuals
truthfully report their types, the rankings rij induce a transitive relation, and yield
the complete ranking generated by T.
Necessity. Suppose that the social network g satisfies the conditions of Lemma 1
but that there exists a pair of individuals (i, j) who observe each other but are not
observed by any third individual k. Consider a realization of the characteristics such
that θi and θj are the two lowest characteristics. Let T1 be the type profile if θi < θj
and T2 the type profile if θj < θi.
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By ex post efficiency, because the rankings generated by T1 and T2 are complete,
ρi(T1) = ρj(T2) = 1,
ρi(T2) = ρj(T1) = 2.
Because there are only two announcements tiij and t
j
ij on the link (i, j), ex post
incentive compatibility requires that individuals i and j cannot improve their ranking
by changing their reports on the link (i, j). Let T−ij denote the announcements on
all links but link ij. We must have
ρi(T−ij, tiij = 1, t
j
ij = −1) = ρi(T1) = 1,
ρj(T−ij, tiij = 1, t
j
ij = −1) = ρj(T2) = 1.
resulting in a contradiction as i and j cannot both be ranked at position 1.
Proof of Theorem 3
We establish the Theorem through a sequence of claims. Let `(g) be the number
of links in the social network g.
Claim 1. If the social network is completely informative, then every individual must
have at least 2 friends.
Proof. Let di be the number of friends of individual i. As g is connected, di ≥ 1 for
all i ∈ N . Suppose that di = 1, and consider the unique neighbor j of i. As di = 1,
there is no k 6= j which is connected to i and can draw a comparison between i and
j. Hence the network g is not completely informative, establishing a contradiction.
Claim 2. If for any (i, j) there exists k such that gikgjk = 1, then `(g) ≥ 3(n−1)2 if n
is odd and `(g) ≥ 3n
2
− 1 if n is even.
Proof. Consider the following problem: For a fixed number of links L, compute
the maximal number of comparisons of neighbors that can be generated by a social
network g when all nodes have degree contained in [2, n − 1]. More precisely, let
(d1, .., dn) denote the degree sequence of g with the understanding that di−1 ≥ di for
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all i = 1, .., n. Then consider the problem:
max
(d1,...,dn)
d1(d1 − 1)
2
+
d2(d2 − 1)
2
+ ...+
dn(dn − 1)
2
subject to 2 ≤ di ≤ n− 1 ∀i ,
d1 + d2 + ...+ dn = 2L .
Notice that the objective function V (d1, .., dn) =
d1(d1−1)
2
+ d2(d2−1)
2
+ ...+ dn(dn−1)
2
is strictly increasing and convex in (d1, ..., dn).
Assume first that n is odd. Then pick L = 3(n−1)
2
and d1 = n−1, d2 = .. = dn = 2.
Because V is strictly convex,
V (n− 1, 2, ..., 2) = (n− 1)(n− 2)
2
+ n− 1
=
n(n− 1)
2
> V (d1, ..., dn)
for any (d1, .., dn) 6= (n−1, 2, ...2) such that d1+ ..+dn = 3(n−1) and di ≥ 2 for all i.
Now n(n−1)
2
is the total number of comparisons. So, as V (d1, .., dn) is strictly increasing
in n, the social network g must contain at least 3(n−1)
2
links for all comparisons to be
constructed.
Assume next that n is even. Pick L = 3n
2
− 1 and d1 = n − 1, d2 = 3, d3 = .. =
dn = 2. Because V is strictly convex,
V (n− 1, 3, 2, ..., 2) = (n− 1)(n− 2)
2
+ 3 + n− 2
=
n(n− 1)
2
+ 1
> V (d1, ..., dn)
for any (d1, .., dn) 6= (n− 1, 3, 2, ...2) such that d1 + ..+ dn = 3n− 2 and di ≥ 2 for all
i.
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In addition notice that for L′ = 3n
2
− 2,
V (n− 2, 2, 2, ..., 2) = (n− 2)(n− 3)
2
+ n− 1
=
(n− 2)2 − n
2
> V (d1, ..., dn)
for any (d1, .., dn) 6= (n− 2, 2, 2, ...2) such that d1 + ..+ dn = 3n− 4 and di ≥ 2 for all
i.
Hence, the maximum of Vi is smaller than
n(n−1)
2
when `(g) = 3n
2
− 2 and greater
than n(n−1)
2
when `(g) = 3n
2
− 1, establishing that the social network g must contain
at least 3n
2
− 1 links for all comparisons to be constructed.
Next we observe that the friendship network and the modified windmill network
generate all comparisons.
Claim 3. If n is odd, the friendship network containing exactly 3(n−1)
2
links, generates
all comparisons. If n is even, the windmill with sails of size 2 and one sail of size 3
with an additional link, containing exactly 3n
2
− 1 links, generates all comparisons.
Proof. The hub of the network, node nh, provides the comparisons between all other
(n−1) nodes. If n is odd, in any petal (i, j), i provides the comparison between j and
nh and j provides the comparison between i and nh. If n is even, in any sail of size
2, (i, j),i provides the comparison between j and nh and j provides the comparison
between i and nh. In the unique sail of size 3, (i, j, k), i provides the comparison
between j and nh, j provides the comparisons between i and nh and k and nh and k
provides a (redundant) comparison between j and nh.
Finally we establish that the friendship network and the modified windmill net-
work are the only network architectures generating all comparisons with the minimal
number of edges.
Claim 4. If n is odd, the friendship network is the only network with degree sequence
(n− 1, 2, ..., 2). If n is even, the modified windmill network with n
2
− 2 sails of size 2
and one sail of size 3 with an additional link is the only network with degree sequence
(n− 1, 3, 2, ..2).
Proof. Let n be odd. Because one node has degree n − 1, the network is connected
and this node is a hub. All other nodes must be connected to the hub, and if they
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have degree 2, they must be mutually connected to one other node. Let n be even.
The same argument shows that all nodes with degree 2 must be connected to the hub
and one other node. These nodes are mutually connected except for the petal of size
3, where one node is connected to the two other nodes in the sail.
Proof of Proposition 1
Let i and j be two nodes such that gij = 1 but there is no k such that gik = gjk = 1.
As in the necessity part of the proof of Proposition 1, consider a realization of the
characteristics such that θi and θj are the two lowest characteristics. Partition the
set of individuals different from i and j according to their distance to the node i. Let
A1i = {a|a 6= j, d(a, i) = 1}, A2i = {a|d(a, i) = 2}, Ami = {a|d(a, i) = m}. Fix the
characteristics of the individuals in such a way that θk > θl if d(k, i) > d(l, i).
Consider two type profiles T1 and T2 which agree on all comparisons except that
θi < θj in T1 and θj < θi in T2. Clearly, for any k 6= i, j, if k T1 j then k T1 i, as i
and j can be compared under T1. Similarly, if k T2 i then k T2 j. Furthermore, as
θi and θj are the two smallest characteristics, all individuals k which can be compared
to i and j have higher rank than i and j.
We now claim that all individuals can be compared to i. Pick an individual k
at a distance d(k, i) from i. Consider a shortest path k = k0, ...i = km from k to
i. Then km−1 ∈ A1i , km−2 ∈ A2i ...k0 ∈ Ad(k,i)i . Hence θk1 < θk2 < ...θkm = θk. As
gk1k2 = gk2k3 = .. = gkm−1km = 1, we must have tk1k2 = tk2k3 = .. = tkm−1km = −1, so
that k can be compared to i and has a higher rank than i and j.
Now, by ex post efficiency,
ρi(T1) = ρj(T2) = 1,
ρi(T2) = ρj(T1) = 2.
Because there are only two announcements tiij and t
j
ij on the link (i, j), ex post
incentive compatibility requires that individuals i and j cannot improve their ranking
by changing their reports on the link (i, j). Let T−ij denote the announcements on
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all links but link ij. We must have
ρi(T−ij, tiij = 1, t
j
ij = −1) = ρi(T1) = 1,
ρj(T−ij, tiij = 1, t
j
ij = −1) = ρj(T2) = 1,
resulting in a contradiction as i and j cannot both be ranked at position 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
We first prove the following Claim.
Claim 5. The comparison network is connected if and only if for all i, j ∈ N , there
exists an even walk between i and j.
Proof. Suppose first that h is connected. Pick any two nodes i, j ∈ N and a walk
i = i0, ..., im = j in h. By definition, for any (ik, ik+1) in the walk, there exists jk ∈ N
such that ik, ik+1 ∈ Njk . But this implies that there exists a walk in g connecting i
to j given by i0, j0, i1, j1, ..., im−1, jm−1, im.5 This walk contains an even number of
edges, proving necessity of the claim.
Next suppose that h is not connected and let i and j be two nodes in different
components of h. We want to show that all walks between i and j in g are odd.
Consider first a path between i and j. If the path is even, there exists a sequence
of nodes i = i0, i1, .., im = j where m = 2l is even such that gik,ik+1 = 1 for all
k. But then, for any l = 0, m
2
− 1, hi2l,i2l+1 = 1, and hence there exists a path
i = i0, i2, ..., im = j ∈ f , contradicting the fact that i and j belong to two different
components in h. Hence all paths between i and j are odd. If there exists an even
walk between i and j in g, it must thus involve an odd cycle starting at i or starting
at j. Without loss of generality, suppose that there exists an odd cycle starting at i,
i = i0, ..., im = i, where m = 2l + 1 is odd. Consider any even path between i and j,
where we index i = im, ...ir = j and r = 2p is even. We construct a path in h between
i and j as follows. Because m is odd, we first construct the sequence of connected
nodes in h, i = i2l+1, i2l−1, i2l−3, .., i1. Because i is connected in g both to i1 and im+1,
we then link i1 to im+1 in h. Now m + 1 is even, so we can use the path between i
and j to construct a sequence im+1, .., ir = j in h. Concatenating the two sequences,
5Note that this walk is not necessarily a path even if the initial walk in h is a path, as the same
node jk can be used several times in the walk.
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we construct a sequence i, im−2, ..., i1, im+1, .., ir = j in h, contradicting the fact that
i and j belong to two different components in h. Hence if h is not connected, there
exists a pair of nodes i, j such that all walks between i and j are odd, proving the
necessity of the claim.
We now prove the second claim
Claim 6. For all i, j ∈ N there exists an even walk between i and j if and only if g
is not bipartite.
Proof. Suppose that g is bipartite with sets A and B. As N ≥ 3, at least one of the
two sets has more than one element. Pick i, j such that i ∈ A and j ∈ B, then we
claim that all walks between i and j must be odd. Any walk between i and j must
contain an even number of edges alternating between nodes in A and B and a single
edge between a node in A and a node in B. Hence the total number of edges must
be odd, proving the necessity of the claim.
Conversely, suppose that there exists a pair of nodes i, j such that all walks
between i and j are odd. Consider the sets of nodes A = {k|δ(i, k) is even} and
B = {k|δ(i, k) is odd }, where δ(i, k) denotes the geodesic distance between i and k
in the graph. We first claim that if k ∈ A, all walks between i and k must be even.
Suppose not, then there exist two different walks between i and k, one w1 which is
even (the shortest path between i and k) and one w2 which is odd. Pick one particular
path p between k and j. If this path is odd, then the walk between i and j containing
w2 followed by p is even, contradicting the assumption. If the path is even, then the
walk between i and j containing w1 followed by p is even, contradicting the assump-
tion again. Hence all walks between i and nodes in A are even and all walks between
i and nodes in B are odd. Next notice that there cannot be any edge between nodes
in A. Suppose by contradiction that there exists an edge between k and l in A, and
consider a walk between i and k, w1 followed by the edge kl. This forms an odd walk
between i and l, contradicting the fact that all walks between i and l must be even.
Hence, there is no edge between nodes in A and similarly no edge between nodes in
B, showing that the graph g is bipartite.
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider a mechanism where all individuals in A are ranked above individuals in
B. For any two individuals i and j in A, let ρ(i) > ρ(j) if i T j. If i ./T j or if
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the reports on i and j are incompatible, construct an arbitrary ranking by letting
ρ(i) > ρ(j) if and only if i > j. Similarly, for any two individuals i and j in B, let
ρ(i) > ρ(j) if i T j. If i ./T j or if the reports on i and j are incompatible, let
ρ(i) > ρ(j) if and only if i > j.
We will show that the mechanism satisfies ex post incentive compatibility and
efficiency.
The mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness, a stronger incentive compatibility no-
tion than ex post incentive compatibility. Consider an individual i in A. Then we
claim that if tijk 6= 0 it must be that both j and k are in B. To see this notice that as
g is bipartite it does not contain any triangle. Hence no self-report can be supported
by a third individual, and hence tiij = 0 for all j 6= i. The only case where tijk 6= 0
is thus when gijgik = 1 and j, k ∈ B. Hence, by changing his report tijk, individual
i can only affect the ranking of individuals in B. As all individuals in B are ranked
below individuals in A, this does not affect the rank of individual i, and hence indi-
vidual i’s ranking is independent of his announcement, proving that the mechanism
is strategy-proof.
Finally, notice that by construction, the mechanism ρ achieves an ex post efficient
ranking separately on each of the two components A and B. by Proposition 2, the
comparison network h is disconnected into two components A and B. Hence the
mechanism ρ is also ex post efficient.
Proof of Proposition 4
We consider the same mechanism as in the proof of Theorem 1: We define the
mechanism ρ by constructing comparisons. Let rij denote the comparison between i
and j chosen by the planner.
First consider a pair of individuals (i, j) who observe each other, gij = 1. By
assumption, there are at least three reports on the ranking of i and j. If all individuals
transmit the same report on (i, j), let rij = tij. If all individuals but one transmit
the same report tij and one individual reports t
′ij = −tij, ignore the ranking t′ij and
let rij = tij. In all other cases, let rij = 1 if and only if i > j.
Second consider a pair of individuals (i, j) who do not observe each other, gij = 0.
If there are at least three individuals who observe i and j, use as above a mechanism
such that rij = tij if all individuals agree on tij or only one individual chooses t
′
ij =
−tij, and let rij = 1 if i > j otherwise.
If one or two individuals observe i, j, pick the individual k with the highest index.
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Consider the vector of announcements T˜−k where one disregards the announcements
of individual k. Let T˜−k be the binary relation created by letting tij = 1 if and only
if tlij = 1 for all l 6= k. If there exists a directed path of length greater or equal to 2
between i and j in T˜−k , and for all directed paths between i and j in T˜−k , i0, .., iL
we have tilil+1 = 1, then rij = 1. If on the other hand for all directed paths between i
and j in T˜−k , tilil+1 = −1, then rij = −1. In all other cases, let individual k dictate
the comparison between i and j, rij = t
k
ij.
Now consider all comparisons rij. If they induce a transitive binary relation on
N , let ρ be the complete order generated by the comparisons. Otherwise, consider all
shortest cycles generated by the binary relation rij. If there exists a single individual
i who dictates at least two comparisons in all shortest cycles, individual i is punished
by setting ρi = 1 and ρj > ρk if and only if j > k for all j, k 6= i. If this is not the
case, pick the arbitrary ranking where ρi > ρj if and only if i > j.
We now prove that this mechanism satisfies ex post efficiency and incentive com-
patibility.
Consider any pair (i, j) such that i T j. There must exist a sequence of compar-
isons (i, i1, .., it, .., iT , j) such that hit−1it = 1 and i
t−1 T it. For any of these pairs, we
must have rit−1it = 1 and hence, because the announcement T generates a transitive
partial order, ρ(it−1) > ρ(it). But this implies that ρ(i) > ρ(j), establishing that the
mechanism satisfies ex post efficiency.
Finally, we show that the mechanism is ex post incentive-compatible. Consider
individual k’s incentive to change his announcement on a link ij when all other
individuals tell the truth. If the link ij is supported, this change does not affect the
outcome of the mechanism. So consider an unsupported link ij and let individual k
be the highest index individual observing i and j. Suppose that all individuals l 6= k
announce the truth, so that T˜−k=T−k . We first show that individual k cannot gain
by making an announcement which generates cycles in the ranking rij.
Suppose that the binary relation generated by rij exhibits a cycle i
0i1...iL
By the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 1, individual k must dictate at
least two comparisons in the cycle. We will show that the initial cycle must contain
a cycle of length 3. Suppose that the initial cycle has length greater than or equal
to 4. Let ij and lm be two comparisons dictated by individual k. Suppose first that
the rank of l is strictly higher than the rank of j. As individual k observes both (i, j)
and (l,m), he also observes both i and l. Hence i and l must be compared under r
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and either ril = 1 or ril = −1. Now if ril = −1, one can construct a shorter cycle by
replacing the path lm..i by the path li. If ril = +1, one can construct a shorter cycle
by replacing the path ij, , l by the path il. Next suppose that j = l so that the two
comparisons (i, j) and (l,m) are adjacent in the cycle. Again because individual k
observes both i and m, then i and m must be compared under r and either rim = +1
or rim = −1. If rim = +1, one can construct a shorter cycle by replacing ijm with
im. If rim = −1, one can construct a cycle of length 3 ijmi.
We conclude that if the binary relation r exhibits a cycle, there must exist a sub-
cycle of length 3, so that all shortest cycles are of length 3. Furthermore, individual
k must dictate at least two of the comparisons in all cycles. Hence, individual indi-
vidual k has no incentive to make an announcement generating a cycle in r, as he
will be punished and obtain the lowest rank.
We finally assume that the ranking generated by r is acyclic and show that the
rank of individual k must remain the same if he changes his report on any pair (i, j).
Notice first that, if k dictates the ranking between i and j, i and j there does not exist
a l such that i, j and l can be ranked under T−k. In fact, if i, j and l can be ranked
using the reports of individuals in N \ k, they unanimously rank i and j through
a path of length equal or greater than 3 and the mechanism does not let k dictate
the choice between i and j. But this implies that whenever k is a dictator over the
pair (il, jl) both individuals il and jl are either both ranked above or below k by the
reports T−k .
Now let J = (i1, j1), ..., (il, jl), ..(iL, jL) be the pairs on which k is a dictator and
let J+ denote the set of pairs (il, jl) such that k T−k il, jl and J− the set of pairs such
that k ≺T−k il, jl. Let T′ = (T−k, T ′k) the announcement obtained when i changes
his report on some of the pairs in J while keeping a transitive partial order. For any
m such that k T−k m, k T m and k T′ m. Hence ρk(T) > ρm(T) and ρk(T′) >
ρm(T
′). Similarly, for any m such that k ≺T−k m, k ≺T m and k ≺T′ m. Hence
ρk(T) < ρm(T) and ρk(T
′) < ρm(T′). We also have, for any m ∈ J+, ρk(T) > ρm(T)
and ρk(T
′) > ρm(T′). For any m ∈ J−, ρk(T) < ρm(T) and ρk(T′) < ρm(T′). Next
consider m such that k ./T−k m and m /∈ J . If m ≺T−k il for some il ∈ J+, then
k T m and k T′ m so that ρk(T) > ρm(T) and ρk(T′) > ρm(T′). Similarly, if
m T−k il for some il ∈ J−, then k ≺T m and k ≺T′ m so that ρk(T) < ρm(T) and
ρk(T
′) < ρm(T′). Finally, if m T−i il∀il ∈ J+,m ≺T−k il∀il ∈ J− and k ./T−k m,
then k ./T m and k ./T′ m. Whenever k ./T m and k ./T′ m, then the ranking
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between k and m is independent of the type profile. Hence, in all cases the ranking
between k and m is identical under T and T′. This argument completes the proof
that the mechanism satisfies ex post incentive compatibility.
Proof of Proposition 5
We first establish the following simple general claim:
Claim 7. If ρ is strategy-proof, ρi(T
i, Tˆ−i) = ρi(T
′i, Tˆ−i) for all i, T i, T
′i, Tˆ−i.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that there exists i, T i, T
′i, Tˆ−i such that ρi(T i, Tˆ−i) >
µi(T
′i, Tˆ−i). Let T
′i be the true type of individual i. Then, individual i has an
incentive to announce T i, contradicting the fact that ρ is strategy-proof.
Consider next two vectors of types:
• T1: tij = tjk = tik = 1
• T2: tij = −1, tjk = 1, tik = −1
As the mechanism is ex post efficient, it must assign ranks ρi(T1) = 3, ρj(T1) =
2, ρk(T1) = 1, ρi(T2) = 1, ρj(T2) = 3, ρk(T2) = 2.
Now let ti denote the announcement tiij = t
i
jk = t
i
ik = 1 and t
′i the announcement
tiij = −1, tijk = 1, tiik = −1. By Claim 7,
ρi(t
′i, tj, tk) = ρi(t
i, tj, tk) = 3,
ρj(t
i, t
′j, tk) = ρj(t
i, tj, tk) = 2.
ρk(t
′i, t
′j, tk) = ρk(t
′i, t
′j, t
′k) = 2.
Hence we conclude that, at (t
′i, t
′j, tk) either ρi = 3, ρj = 1 or ρi = 1, ρj = 3. But
ρj = 3 is impossible, as, by claim 7, ρj(t
′i, t
′j, tk) = ρj(t
′i, tj, tk) and ρj(t
′i, tj, tk) 6=
ρi(t
′i, tj, tk) = 3. Hence we conclude that
ρi(t
′i, t
′j, tk) = 3, ρj(t
′i, t
′j, tk) = 1, ρk(t
′i, t
′j, tk) = 2. (1)
A similar reasoning shows that
ρj(t
′i, tj, t
′k) = 3,
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and hence either ρi = 2, ρk = 1 or ρi = 1, ρk = 3 at (t
′i, tj, t
′k). But ρi(t
′i, tj, t
′k) =
ρi(t
i, tj, t
′k) 6= ρk(ti, tj, t′k) = ρk(ti, tj, tk) = 1. So we conclude that
ρi(t
′i, tj, t
′k) = 2, ρj(t
′i, tj, t
′k) = 3, ρk(t
′i, tj, t
′k) = 1. (2)
Now, ρj(t
′i, tj, tk) = ρj(t
′i, t
′j, tk). By equation 1,
ρj(t
′i, t
′j, tk) = 1
,
so that ρj(t
′i, tj, tk) = 1. As ρi(t
′i, tj, tk) = ρi(t
i, tj, tk) = 1,
ρk(t
′i, tj, tk) = 2.
Similarly, ρk(t
′i, tj, tk) = ρk(t
′i, tj, t
′k) and by equation 2,
ρk(t
′i, tj, t
′k) = 1
so that
ρk(t
′i, tj, tk) = 1.
establishing a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 6
If individuals strictly prefer being ranked at ρ(i) = 2 to being ranked at ρ(i), the
necessity part of the proof of Theorem 1 shows that whenever there exists a pair of
individuals who are not observed by a third individual, there cannot exist an ex post
incentive-compatible and efficient mechanism.
Conversely, if individuals are indifferent between being ranked at ρ(i) = 1 and
ρ(i) = 2, let ρ(i) = 1 and ρ(j) = 2 whenever i and j are the only two individuals
observing the ranking between i and j and tiij 6= tjij. This guarantees that individuals
have no incentive to send conflicting reports, and hence that this mechanism, com-
pleted by the mechanism constructed in the sufficiency part of Theorem 1, satisfies
ex post incentive compatibility and efficiency.
Proof of Proposition 7
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Consider a vector of announcements where all three individuals agree on t13 =
−1, t23 = −1, t12 = 1. By ex post efficiency, ρ(1) = 2, ρ(2) = 1, ρ(3) = 3. We
claim that ex post group-incentive compatibility implies that, whenever individual
3 announces t313 = −1, t323 = −1, t312 = 1, the rank of individual 1 must be different
from 3. If that were not the case, there would exist an announcement (t
′1, t
′2) for
individuals 1 and 2 resulting in a rank ρ(1) = 3 > 2, ρ(2) ≥ 1, contradicting ex
post group-incentive compatibility. By a similar reasoning, whenever individual 1
announces t112 = 1, t
1
13 = 1, t
1
23 = 1, the rank of individual 2 must be different from
3. Finally, when individual 2 announces t212 = −1, t223 = 1, t213 = −1, the rank of
individual 3 must be different from 3.
So consider the announcement t1 = (t112 = 1, t
1
13 = 1, t
1
23 = 1), t
2 = (t212 = −1, t223 =
1, t213 = −1), t3 = (t313 = −1, t323 = −1, t312 = 1). For this announcement, neither of
the three individuals can be in position 3, a contradiction which completes the proof
of the Proposition.
50
